We analyze a model where a multinational rm can use its superior technology in a foreign subsidiary only after appropriate training of local managers. Technological spillovers from foreign direct investment arise when such managers are later hired by a local rm. Bene ts for the host economy m a y also take the form of the rent that trained managers receive b y the foreign a liate to prevent them from moving to local competitors. We s t u d y conditions under which t e c hnological spillovers occur. We a l s o show that under certain circumstances the multinational rm might nd it optimal to resort to export instead of foreign direct investment, to avoid dissipation of its intangible assets.
Introduction
The existence of spillovers from multinational enterprises (MNEs) has often been indicated as one of the reasons why foreign direct investments (FDIs) might bene t a host economy 1 . Spillovers might take di erent forms.
First, there might exist backward and forward linkages between foreign a liates and local rms (Lall, 1980 , Rodriguez-Clare, 1996 . Second, foreign a liates might increase local rms' productivity through 'demonstration e ects'. For instance, domestic competitors might successfully imitate technological innovations introduced by MNEs (Bl omstrom, 1986, Mans eld and Romeo, 1980) . Third, spillovers arise when subsidiaries of foreign rms train local employees which will later join local rms or set up their own companies, bringing with them all (or part of) the technological, marketing, and managerial knowledge that they have previously acquired.
In this paper, we are concerned with the last form of spillovers, and we present a model where (technological or managerial) spillovers take place due to the mobility o f w orkers which h a ve been instructed by a MNE's subsidiary. Our main purpose is to study the conditions under which s u c h spillovers occur.
The fact that MNEs undertake substantial e orts in the education of local workers has been documented in many instances (e.g., see ILO, 1981 and Lindsey, 1986) , and empirical research seems to indicate that MNEs o er more training to technical workers and managers than local rms do (Gerschenberg, 1987 , Chen, 1983 . At their early stages a liates rely more intensively on expatriates , but subsequently they tend to replace them with (cheaper) local workers who have been properly trained in the meanwhile (UNLTC, 1993) .
We build a model where subsidiaries of MNEs and local rms compete for the services of local workers who have been previously instructed by the MNEs. As a result, the MNEs will manage to keep the instructed workers only if they o er better conditions than the local rms do. MNEs have often been found to pay higher wages than domestic rms for similar job positions (UNLTC, 1993, Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey, 1995) . However, it has also been reported that there exists high mobility of trained workers from foreign a liates to local rms (e.g., see Gerschenberg, 1987 , Katz, 1987 , ILO, 1981 , World Investment Report, 1992 ). We are not aware of any empirical study 1 See Bl omstrom and Kokko (1996) for an extensive review of spillover e ects of the activities of MNEs.
which links these two phenomena, but our analysis suggests they are related.
Our model helps identify the circumstances under which w orkers' mobility t a k es place. We nd that the so-called 'joint-pro t e ect' (or 'e ciency e ect') plays an important role here. If the pro t made by the MNE when it can use the technology as a monopolist is higher than the aggregate pro t made by the MNE and the local rm when both can use the technology, then spillovers will not occur. This is a result which is similar to the one obtained in the literature which studies persistence of monopolies. More generally, technology will not di use to the local rms when they attach a l o wer value than the foreign a liate to it. This might be the case, for example, when some complementary assets not possessed by the local rms are needed to use e ciently the know-how brought b y w orkers.
Finally, a MNE might a n ticipate that by i n vesting abroad and instructing local workers to use some particular technology might lead either to spillovers of knowledge to local rms or to higher wages to prevent w orkers from moving. Therefore, it might c hoose exports instead of FDIs to protect intangible assets or to avoid the payment o f r e n ts to trained workers. Although our feeling is that this is unlikely to be a major variable in determining the choice between exports and FDIs, anecdotal evidence con rms that such a motivation might sometimes be behind the choice of exporting.
An illustrative example is drawn from the history of the chemical sector (Kudo, 1993) . After World War I, the leading German chemical company IG Farben decided to increase its activity in the growing Japanese market. At the time, the German chemical industry had a signi cant competitive edge over international competitors and more speci cally over the Japanese industry, then at its infant stage. IG Farben resorted to exports and avoided as much as possible FDI (and licensing) in order to minimize the di usion of knowledge to competitors.
Other game theoretical models have dealt with the existence of spillovers from internationalization choices of rms, even though from di erent perspectives. In Ethier and Markusen (1996) technological spillovers arise as a result of a double moral hazard problem. A foreign rm endowed with a superior technology might renege an exclusive contract with a local licensee by transferring technology to other local rms, whereas the licensee might 'cheat' by i n troducing a marginal improvement in the technology after having obtained the basic technology from the licensor. Motta (1996) and Siotis (1997) analyze decisions between exports and FDIs but they simply assume that when two rms locate in the same region a proportion of their knowhow spills over to each other. This 'black-box' type of spillovers is quite familiar in the R&D literature (e.g., d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model and draws some rst general results. Section 3 expands our analysis and considers rst the case of asymmetric information between the MNE and the local rm about the value of a trained manager and second some alternative c o n tract speci cations not considered in the basic model. Section 4 studies a parametric example to perform some comparative statics on how certain variables a ect the existence of spillovers as well as the choice between exports and FDIs. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The model
A r m h (the MNE) has some payo relevant information which c a n b e thought o f a s a n e w t e c hnology, a new production process, a new managerial technique, or a new product. This knowledge has been accumulated prior to the game and it is exogenously given in our model. It has not been commercialized yet by rm h in a foreign country, on which m a r k et we focus 2 .
Firm h can either serve the foreign market through exports or establish a local subsidiary (i.e., make a F D I ) . W e assume that both modes of involvement g i v e rise to positive pro ts, and disregard uninteresting cases where selling in the foreign market is not pro table. FDI requires the rm to transfer its technology to the subsidiary. W e assume that such a transfer is successful only if a local manager is properly informed about the new technology and that the relevant knowledge cannot be transmitted without oral communication or on-the-job training.
Apart from the MNE, there also exists a local rm f which could sell the product if it knew how the technology works. One might think of such a rm as a company which is producing goods in a related industry. W e exclude the possibility of licensing agreements as a way o f t e c hnology transfer by assuming that the costs of contracting upon this knowledge-based asset are large enough.
The basic features of the game are described in Figure 1 . At t i m e t = 0 , r m h decides whether to export or make a FDI. When exporting, the rm will make use of production facilities and properly trained managers located in the home country. When investing in the host market, 2 Firm h might be the only rm in the world endowed with the new technology. Alternatively, it might be the only one that considers to serve that foreign market. instead, the rm will have to incur a xed cost G, which includes all the expenses which should be made to operate in a less well-known foreign environment. Note that the local rm does not have to incur this cost since it is already familiar with the local market. We also assume that it is too expensive for the MNE to move in a stable way a manager from the parent company to the a liate, for instance because an expatriate worker would ask for too high a relocation allowance, or because the MNE is located originally in a country with much higher labor costs, which m a k e it less costly to train and hire local workers 3 .
The only possible channel to transfer knowledge is to train a local manager. Therefore, if FDI is chosen, a sta of supervisors comes from the headquarters to the a liate and instructs a local worker. Then they move back to their home country 4 . The total cost of training a local worker is F .
The worker who receives training is hired from a pool of identical untrained workers. She is paid the reservation wage w which is normalized to zero. We assume that it is impossible for the MNE to write a legally binding contract which obliges the worker to stay with the company f o r t wo periods. Initially, w e also assume that the worker is wealth-constrained and that she cannot borrow on the nancial market, so that the rst period wage must be non-negative. We discuss these assumptions in section 3.2.
After receiving proper training, the local manager (henceforth we shall refer to her as the 'informed' manager) has acquired all the necessary expertise, knowledge and information to produce the good. At period t = 1 , production takes place, the good is sold and rst-period pro ts are realized. Since in this rst period of the game the local rm is not aware of the new technology, r m h is a monopolist in the market. Its pro t is Afterwards, rm f realizes that it could also appropriate the technology by hiring the informed manager. The MNE would like to retain her within the company t o a void the dissipation of the rents associated with its knowledge-based asset.
We model this process by assuming that each rm simultaneously and independently makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er to the informed manager. The This assumption is made to reproduce what seems to be a realistic situation, but the analysis would not change much i f w e assumed that foreign managers might w ork abroad on a permanent basis. 4 Alternatively one can think that a local manager is sent abroad to receive the proper education at the parent company. rm who o ers more hires the manager and has to pay the wage it has offered. Put di erently, the hiring process works like a rst price auction. If both rms o er the same wage we assume that the rm with the highest valuation of the manager hires her (this assumption is made to guarantee equilibrium in pure strategies). In this section we assume rms have symmetric information about the value of the informed manager. In section 3 we study the case of asymmetric information. Also note that we are assuming away the possibility that the local frim might h i r e w orkers located in the home country of the MNE. Therefore, no spillovers can occur when the MNE chooses to export. 5 We shall focus on the equilibrium where the rm with the highest willingness to pay for the informed manager will hire her by o ering exactly the maximum willingness to pay of the rival 6 . This implies that the informed manager will appropriate some of the informational rent associated to the knowledge of how the new technology operates.
The willingness to pay for the informed manager of each rm depends on the outside options. We assume that if rm f does not hire the informed manager in the second period it does not have a n y other possibility to acquire the technology and therefore it will make zero pro ts (imitation is therefore ruled out in our model). If the MNE loses the informed manager, it can either call back the sta from the headquarters to instruct another local manager (and incur another cost F ) or it can resort to export from the home country to serve the host country in the second period. Instead, the MNE would never prefer to export after having established a subsidiary and kept the informed manager within the company ( b y assumption
Note also from Figure 1 that rm h might w ant to establish a local subsidiary after having served the market through exports in the rst period.
After the MNE decides about exports or FDI, production takes place and the second-period payo s are realized.
Let us brie y summarize some pieces of notation before solving the game. Denote by s t k i the pro t earned by rm i = h f , i n p e r i o d t = 1 2, where 5 It seems reasonable to assume that it would be more di cult for the local rm to identify informed workers if they are in another country, and/or to attract such w orkers from abroad if identi ed. 6 There are other equilibria where both rms o er a wage between the lowest and the highest valuation of the manager and the rm with the highest valuation hires her. However, in these equilibria the rm with the lowest valuation is playing a weakly dominated strategy (compared to o ering its own valuation of the manager) and therefore we disregard them. k = M D (M, for 'monopoly' when only rm h has the technology D, for 'duopoly' when the local competitor also has it) and s = I E(I stands for FDI and E for exports). The superscript s is used only in the pro t expressions of the MNE. Also, denote v max i as the maximum willingness to pay for the informed manager of rm i.
We look for the sub-game perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the game. It is straightforward to solve the model by b a c kward induction. For expositional reasons we focus initially only on the con gurations we consider more interesting. To this purpose, we i n troduce two further assumptions 7 .
A1:
The rst assumption says that the pro ts from FDI in the second period (net of set up costs and training costs, which are sunk at the last stage of the game) are never smaller than the pro ts from exports. This guarantees that, in the second period, the MNE always runs a subsidiary in the foreign country. The second assumption narrows the set of possible alternatives available to the MNE when the informed manager is hired by the local rm. It imposes that, in the second period, it is always more pro table to keep the foreign a liate active (this requires the training of another local manager) than to shut it down and resort to exports. In other words, these two assumptions say that the MNE never exports in the second period.
Finally, the following additional assumptions allow us to focus on nontrivial equilibria:
A3:
F . Assumption A3 says that a rm makes larger pro ts when it is a monopolist than when it is a duopolist. If this did not hold, as in cases of strong complementarities with the local rm's production, the MNE would have an incentive to reveal its technology to the local rm, and spillovers would trivially occur.
Assumption A4 says that the MNE has to pay m o r e t o a void that the manager is hired by the other rm (see below) than to train a second manager. If it did not hold, then spillovers would never occur under A3, since the MNE would always keep the worker. 7 These assumptions could be relaxed without changing the main results (see also section 4), but at the cost of making the analysis far more complex.
A crucial step to nd the equilibrium solutions is to identify the outcome of the hiring process. The rm with the highest willingness to pay will hire the informed manager during the second period. The local rm's maximum willingness to pay for the informed manager is v max f = I 2 D f , since it cannot obtain more than the duopoly pro ts in the second period. Instead, the maximum o er of the MNE is given by the di erence between the monopoly pro t it would earn if it kept the informed manager and the duopoly pro t (net of the cost of training a second local worker) it would earn if it lost the informed manager to the local competitor: In the latter case a technological spillover occurs 8 , since the local rm manages to appropriate some payo relevant information which i t c a n acquire only by hiring a worker which has been previously trained by the MNE.
Note also that in both cases the manager enjoys an informational rent which puts her total two-period income above that earned by all other workers which w ere ex-ante identical 9 .
There are three possible equilibrium situations in the version of the game restricted by assumptions A1 to A4. 1) The MNE establishes a foreign subsidiary in the rst period but it loses the informed manager in the second period to the local rm: there exists a technological spillover. The MNE then instructs another manager and competes with rm h in the second period.
2) The MNE also makes a FDI in the rst period but keeps a monopoly position in the second period, since it keeps the informed manager.
3) The MNE exports in the rst period and avoids both dissipation of its knowledge and an extra wage bill. Since the technology decays after two periods, in the second period the MNE will invest locally to enjoy higher pro ts (by assumption A1).
These are the conditions under which these equilibrium regimes will arise: 1) fdi + fdi (with spillover): 8 Although we label it 'technological' for evocative reasons, the spillover concerns more generally the payo relevant k n o wledge possessed by the MNE, whatever its nature. 9 The crucial assumptions here are that the MNE cannot force a worker to stay within the rm for two periods and that the manager is wealth constrained. See section 3.2 for the outcome of the game if these assumptions were relaxed.
2) fdi + fdi (without spillover):
3) exports + fdi:
The above conditions are of straightforward interpretation. Condition (1a) says that rm h prefers to invest rather than to export (and vice versa) when it anticipates that spillovers would occur if it made a FDI. Condition (1b) determines the result of the hiring process (which t a k es place if rm h has established a local a liate): if it holds, the informed worker will be hired by the local rm f (and vice versa). If condition (2a) holds then rm h prefers investing abroad to exporting when it anticipates that it would keep the informed worker (paying her a rent) in the second period. Condition (3a) states that exports are chosen when neither (1a) or (2a) hold.
To better interpret the results, let us introduce the following de nition:
De nition: We say that the 'joint pro t' e ect holds (does not hold) if the sum of the gross pro ts of two duopolists is smaller or equal (larger) than the gross pro ts of a single monopolist. 10 By inspection of the equilibrium conditions above one can infer the following:
Remark 1: A su cient condition for technological spillovers never to arise is that the 'joint pro t' e ect holds. 10 With homogenous goods, the joint-pro t condition is satis ed under both quantity and price competition. If goods are independent, it does not hold for either form of competition. For any given degree of product di erentiation, it is more likely to hold under quantity than under price competition, since in the former case market competition is less strong and duopoly pro ts higher.
The 'joint pro t' e ect implies that
. This is sufcient to ensure that condition (1b) does not hold and the local rm will not hire the informed manager. This result is reminiscent of the literature which studies persistence of leadership over time. Indeed, the 'joint pro t e ect', also called 'e ciency e ect', has been identi ed as the main condition under which a monopolist manages to keep o potential entrants (e.g., Tirole, 1988, and Budd et al.,1993) .
Note that for the technological spillovers to occur at equilibrium the fact that the 'joint pro t' e ect does not hold is not enough. Two conditions are needed. Firstly, duopoly pro ts net of the cost of training a second worker must be superior to the monopoly pro t (the joint-pro t e ect has been de ned gross of training costs). Secondly, the MNE should not nd it more advantageous to resort to export in the rst period to avoid the dissipation of technological advantage in the second period.
The 'joint pro t' e ect does not hold when the duopolists are not ercely competing against each other. This could be due, for instance, to the local rm producing a good which is only an imperfect substitute, or even complementary, to the one produced by the MNE 11 .
The following two remarks are related to the ty p e o f k n o wledge acquired by the informed manager and the contribution it can give to the pro t of the local rm.
Remark 2: The lower is the value of the informed manager for the local rm, the more likely the MNE keeps her.
Remark 3: Conditional on the MNE keeping the informed m a nager in the second period, the lower is the value of the manager for the local rm, the more likely is FDI in the rst period. Remark 2 states that the lower 2 D f , the more di cult for the local rm to hire the informed manager. When the manager is more productive i n the MNE, the local rm will attach l o wer value than the a liate to her, and will o er her a lower salary. This could be the case when there exist complementarities between the (physical or intangible) assets of the MNE and the manager's expertise. 11 Anecdotal evidence and case studies report that local rms in less developed countries often specialize in speci c inputs or services for the MNE. For instance, Pack (1993) reports that the destination of former trained local managers of MNEs in the chemical industry in Taiwan during the mid 1980s was an entirely di erent sector of activity for a third of the cases. When local rms compete against the MNE they try to di erentiate the product they sell from the one produced by the MNE.
When the local rm attaches less value to the informed manager, the MNE will have t o p a y a l o wer informational rent t o h e r . Remark 3 says that since it is less costly to avoid the dissipation of knowledge associated to the FDI strategy, s u c h a strategy is more likely to occur at equilibrium. For instance, in the extreme case where the informed manager might b e productive only if she can use special facilities uniquely possessed by the MNE, then the MNE could keep the worker by p a ying her the reservation wage and there is no risk of dissipating technology: exports would never be chosen in the rst period.
Extensions
In this section we deal with two di erent extensions. In the rst one, we analyze the case of asymmetric information between the MNE and the local rm about the value of the informed manager.
In the second, we analyze other contractual arrangements which h a ve sofar been excluded.
Asymmetric information case
In this subsection we assume that the local rm observes the existence of the MNE's superior technology, but it does not know the exact pro t it would obtain by hiring the informed manager. This might happen because the local rm does not know h o w t h e k n o wledge accumulated by the local manager interacts with the (exogenous) assets possessed by the rms. Instead, the MNE knows exactly the value the local manager brings to the local rm.
For simplicity the value that the informed manager gives to the local rm is either high or low. Local rm's pro ts are 2 D f (gross of the wage paid to the manager) in the former case. In the latter case the local rm's gross pro ts are 0. 12 If the MNE keeps the manager, its gross pro ts in the second period are The local rm has the prior belief that the manager gives high value with probability e , 0 < e < 1. After the MNE has chosen whether to export or invest in the rst period, the local rm updates its belief about whether the manager is of high or low t ype. We denote by the updated belief.
Finally, w e k eep assumptions A1 to A4.
The Equilibrium of the Game
We look for a perfect bayesian equilibrium of the game by solving it backwards 13 .
The Second Period
In the second period there are two di erent nodes to consider since the MNE has the possibility either to invest or to export in the rst period. As tie-breaking rule we assume that the MNE wins all ties in case (a1) and the local rm wins all ties in case (a2). As before the choice of the tie-breaking rule is due merely to technical reasons. 
which is the (positive) probability that the local rm o ers a zero wage to the informed worker 14 .
The expected e quilibrium pro t of the local rm is 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. Notice that if = 1 o r = 0 the mixed strategy equilibrium described above collapses. Since = 1 corresponds to the symmetric information case, we consider the same equilibrium as in the previous section where the local rm o ers 2 D f for the informed manager. For = 0 the local rm o ers 0 to the manager and the MNE keeps her. The fact that the local rm puts positive probability mass on the zero wage bid implies that the MNE might k eep the manager even when she is of low t ype. In this case, the MNE keeps the worker at zero cost and saves the training cost F . 15 Here, as in the basic model, there exist other equilibria where the MNE o ers more than its valuation of the manager. Since o ering more than its own valuation is a weakly dominated strategy, as before, we disregard these equilibria.
The First Period
If rm h chooses FDI in the rst period, its second period pro ts, conditional on , depend on the manager's type. The mode of serving the market in the rst period (exports or FDI) can therefore potentially signal the type of manager to the local rm. First, we s h o w that no separating equilibrium generically exists. Then, we c haracterize the pooling equilibria and nally the semiseparating equilibria.
In a separating equilibrium the MNE chooses di erent actions for di erent manager's types, and the local rm can infer the manager's type from the MNE's rst period action. However, the following holds:
Lemma 2: Generically, no separating equilibrium exists when the equilibrium in the second period i s a s g i v e n i n L emma 1.
Proof. See the Appendix. In a pooling equilibrium the MNE chooses the same mode of internationalization (either exports or FDI) for both types of managers. It is possible to prove that:
Lemma 3: The MNE chooses to export in the rst period f o r both types of managers if:
It chooses to make a FDI in the rst period i f : Proof. See the Appendix. Finally, the following lemma identi es the only possible semi-separating equilibrium.
Lemma 4: The only semi-separating equilibrium is one where MNE chooses FDI when the manager is of high type, and randomizes between FDI and exports when she is of high type. This equilibrium holds for:
Proof. See the Appendix. Notice that lemmas 2 to 4 characterize the equilibrium of the game for the whole parameter space.
Conclusions
We n o w summarize the analysis of the asymmetric information case, and compare its equilibrium outcome with that obtained under symmetric information. The three pooling equilibrium solutions and the conditions under which they arise are the following.
1') fdi + fdi (with 'probability one' spillover 16 3') exports + fdi:
In the rst equilibrium, the MNE makes a FDI for both types of manager, and the local rm hires her in the second period with probability one. In the second equilibrium, the MNE invests in the rst period for both types of manager, and the local rm hires the high type manager with positive probability. In the third equilibrium, exports are chosen by the MNE for both types of manager in the rst period, and no spillover will occur in the second.
These results show t h a t t e c hnological spillovers always arise with some probability unless exports are chosen. However, it would be incorrect to conclude necessarily that technological spillovers are more likely to occur under asymmetric information. Indeed:
Remark 4: The equilibrium with FDI and 'probability one' spillovers is less likely to arise under asymmetric information. 16 With an abuse of terminology we u s e t h e w ord 'spillover' to identify any situation where turnover occurs. Obviously, the local rm might i n m a n y instances hire a manager who turns out to be ex-post of low t ype. This follows immediately from the observation that the condition (1b') is more restrictive than (1b), its equivalent under symmetric information.
From the comparison of the equilibrium conditions under symmetric and asymmetric information we can also state the following.
Remark 5: FDI is more likely to occur under asymmetric information.
The conditions under which the MNE prefers FDI to exports are given by (1a) and (2a) under symmetric information, and by (1a) and (2a') under asymmetric information. The remark follows from (2a') being less stringent a condition than (2a). Remark 5 has its mirror image in the following:
Remark 6: Exports are less likely to occur under asymmetric information.
To see this result, note that condition (3a') is stronger than condition . Remarks 4 to 6 only concern pooling equilibria. If we also include the area with a semi-separating equilibrium, the regions where FDI and exports can occur are larger than indicated by conditions (1') to (3'). However the region where exports are chosen under asymmetric information is always smaller than under symmetric information. This follows from (3a') and (4) being a more stringent condition than (3a).
The intuition behind Remarks 5 and 6 is as follows. Under asymmetric information the local rm o ers less to the manager than under symmetric information 17 . This makes FDI more attractive compared to the exports, as the MNE has to pay less to keep the manager. Exports are less likely to be chosen, and FDI is more likely to be chosen, relative to the symmetric information case. 17 There are two reasons why the local rm o ers less to the manager under asymmetric information than under symmetric information: 1) for a given 2 D f the informed manager has a priori a lower expected value under asymmetric information, since she is worthless to the local rm with probability ( 1 ; ) 2) the MNE is better informed about the manager's type than the local rm is. The MNE therefore o ers more to the manager when she is of high type rm than when she is of low t ype. The local rm's probability of hiring a manager of high type is therefore lower than . Hence, the local rm o ers, in expected terms, less than the prior expected value of the manager, 2 D f .
Di erent contractual arrangements
In this subsection we study how our results change by i n troducing contractual arrangements which di er from the one considered so far. For simplicity we use the symmetric information framework.
Two-period binding contract
A t wo-period contract rules out the possible turnover of the informed manager in the second period. Thus, spillovers do not arise and the informed manager is hired at the reservation wage (w = 0). In this case, the model reduces a simple one-period decision between FDI and exports. This suggests that spillovers through workers' mobility are more likely to arise in countries where clauses binding workers to their employers are illegale. In some countries, there exist 'con dentiality clauses' and other clauses which make the hiring of trained managers more costly, t h us reducing spillovers.
No wealth constraint
If the informed manager is not wealth constrained (for instance, because she can ask for a bank loan), the MNE anticipates her second period extra It is easy to see that under the set of assumptions we h a ve imposed, exports are never chosen at equilibrium. FDI is always the rst period internationalization strategy and the existence of technological spillovers is driven by inequality (1b).
The Manager Buys the A liate
Suppose the MNE sells the a liate to the manager in the second period. The manager then internalizes the loss the MNE incurs if the local rm acquires the better technology. In the second period the manager has an income of Here, it is assumed that the MNE then brings in another manager. 19 We h a ve assumed that technology is not contractible, and it is therefore an issue whether the manager ex-post would be willing to reveal her knowledge to the local rm. In this case the manager leaves the MNE even if she is the residual claimant. Selling the a liate to the manager does therefore not change the outcome of the game.
To summarize, selling the a liate to the manager does not change her decision between leaving or staying with the MNE. The region with FDI and spillover is therefore the same as in section 2. In the region where the MNE keeps the manager, the MNE can however reduce the manager's informational rents by selling her the a liate (as long as the MNE has some bargaining power vis-a-vis the manager). FDI becomes therefore relatively more attractive compared to exports and the region with exports is reduced.
A parametric example
Here we analyze the same game discussed in section 3 but we i n troduce a parametric model to gain insights about the role played by some economic variables. We also relax assumptions A1, A2 and A4 and keep A3 for expositional convenience. For simplicity w e use the symmetric information framework.
We adopt a version of a model proposed by Singh and Vives (1984) . Assume that in the foreign country identical consumers are endowed with a In our model this problem can however be overcome by a simple contract making the manager's wage conditional on the second period pro t of the local rm. utility function of the following form:
where z is a good produced in a competitive n umeraire sector and x h , x f are di erentiated goods produced at zero marginal cost respectively by the MNE and by the local rm (if it obtains the technology).
The parameter a introduces an asymmetry between the two goods which are symmetric for a = 1 . I f a < 1 the local rm has a cost disadvantage with respect to the MNE if a > 1, it has a cost advantage 20 .
The goods are substitutes, independent or complements according to whether g > 0, g = 0 o r g < 0 respectively. W e assume g 1, with g = 1 corresponding to the case where x h and x f are perfect substitutes 21 . The degree of product di erentiation is measured by 1 =g 2 , so that a decrease in g raises di erentiation between the products.
From the utility maximization of the consumers and from X it = S t x i , with i = h f and t = 1 2, one obtains the following inverse demand structure:
X it + gX jt S t i j = h f i 6 = j (6) where S t is the size of (i.e., the number of consumers in) the foreign market in period t = 1 2 and X h , X f are total quantities sold by e a c h rm.
We assume that if a duopoly structure emerges in the second period, rms compete in quantities 22 . W e also denote by (0 1) the unit export cost (transportation cost or tari ) which the MNE has to bear when serving the foreign market through exports 23 .
Since this model is identical to the one analyzed in section 3 we only need to replace the implicit payo expressions obtained there by the following 20 Note that with a < 1 a n d cf = 0 (where cf is the constant marginal cost of production of good xf ) the model is identical to one where a = 1 and cf = 1 ; a.
21
A reduction in g also increases the global expenditure of the consumers -thus increasing market size, a feature present in other models of product di erentiation. It would be possible to rewrite the demand functions so that the parameter g does not a ect aggregate demand. The qualitative results being unchanged, we h a ve preferred to maintain this formulation which simpli es the presentation.
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Assuming price instead of quantity competition does not a ect the qualitative results of the paper: it just makes it more likely for the 'joint-pro t' e ect to hold and hence more di cult for spillovers to occur at equilibrium. (9) Note that the last expression (9) was not needed in section 2 since we were assuming that the MNE would never export in the second period.
Finally, to simplify notation we normalize to one the sum of market sizes over the two periods, denoting by and 1; the foreign country market size respective l y i n p e r i o d 1 a n d 2 . V ariables such a s G and F should therefore be reinterpreted as divided by the sum of market sizes. Assumptions A1 and A2 can be restated as: 4 . Inequalities A1' and A2' are not any longer assumptions 24 , but they are needed to identify in which branch of the game tree we locate (see Figure  1) .
To simplify the presentation we x t h e v alues of all parameters but g and a (the degree of product di erentiation and the degree of asymmetry between duopolists) and analyze the solution in the plane (a g). Then we m a k e comparative statics exercises by c hanging the value of one of the previously xed parameters. The benchmark case is reported in Figure 2 , which i s d r a wn for the following values: G = 1 32 F= 1 32 = 1 2 = 0 :3. The loci (1a), (1b) and (2b) de ne the equilibrium outcomes of the game. They correspond to the conditions we had analyzed in section 2, and therefore we d o n o t r e p e a t comments on their interpretation. The locus representing A1' is omitted from the graph because such inequality is satis ed for the values considered 24 The only assumption we still keep is A3, which turns out to be satis ed for values of g > 0. If this assumption was removed, there would exist a complementarity b e t ween the goods produced by the MNE and the local rm. The former would therefore have a n incentive to reveal its technology to the latter, and spillovers would trivially arise.
in this gure. The locus representing A2' has been reported for completeness but it plays no role.
Let us now discuss the results obtained. First, as pointed out in section 2, only when the products are rather imperfect substitutes (low v alues of g) can technological spillovers exist. Put di erently, the weaker product market competition the more likely that the local rm will hire the informed manager. Second, technological spillover is more likely to occur the more symmetric the rms are. When a is very small the local rm has no chance to hire the informed manager. When a is very large the MNE anticipates the duopoly structure which w ould arise in period 2 if it made a FDI, and chooses to export in the rst period in order to avoid it. Third, exports may be chosen in the rst period either to avoid the dissipation of the technology to the local competitor, or to save second period extra wage to the informed manager. In either case, the incentive to resort to an export strategy is the stronger the more substitutable the goods (higher g) and the more e cient the local competitor (higher a).
Now that we h a ve built this benchmark case we can do some comparative statics.
In Figure 3 (i) we s h o w the e ect of an increase in transportation costs or tari s ( rises from 0:3 t o 0 :4). Since the export strategy is more costly, the region where FDI occurs at equilibrium expands (the curve (2a) shifts to the right). This can be thought of as the traditional 'tari -jumping' motivation for FDI and it is a well-known outcome (see Motta, 1992) . However, the increase in also reduces the pro tability of resorting to exports to avoid dissipation of technology or extra wage. Hence, spillovers are more likely to occur at equilibrium (both curves (1a) and (2a) shift to the right). This implies that tari s or other similar policy instruments might b e u s e d t o a ttract new technology into the country. According to Siotis (1997) , this is precisely the policy followed by the European Commission to appropriate leading technology possessed by the Japanese in the parts and components consumer electronics industry. He reports that Japanese rms had used only exports and avoided licensing agreement s a n d F D I s i n t h e E U a s a w ay t o preserve their technological edge. Since changes in quotas and tari s were ruled out by the EU commitment in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the European Commission threatened to use other measures such a s a n tidumping duties and safeguard clauses to discourage Japanese exports, promote investments, and create technological spillovers. Figure 3 (ii) illustrates the changes due to a reduction in training costs F . When F decreases the MNE o ers less for the informed manager because its outside option becomes more valuable (it is less costly to bring new instructors into the foreign country). This shifts the (1b) curve u p wards and makes spillovers more likely. Further, the decrease in training costs F also implies that the MNE would save l e s s b y resorting to exports in the rst period (condition (1a) is relaxed and the associated curve shifts upwards), and this increases the region where FDI-cum-spillovers arises. Any policy which might decrease such costs would therefore be welcome if it helped create spillovers which otherwise would not arise. A higher level of education in the local workforce, which w ould make it easier the instruction of local managers, might be an example of such a situation. Figure 3(iii) shows the e ects of a decrease in , that is an increase in the relative importance of second period pro ts. Obviously, this increases the value attached to preserving the technology (future pro ts are relatively more important), which in turn explains the existence of a larger region where exports are chosen in the rst period of the game. It has often been observed that modes of internationalization tend to evolve o ver time, with exports being used in the early periods of foreign involvement, followed by FDI in later periods. For instance Nicholas (1983) reports that 88 percent of his sample of British MNEs in the pre-1939 period sold their products initially through exports before converting to direct sales or production branches. There are probably other stories which explain better this evolution -like the desire to know better a market before committing important resources (Horstmann and Markusen, 1996 ) -but our results suggest that the attempt to keep the technological potential intact might also play a role in certain circumstances.
Finally, Figure 3 (iv) shows the e ect of an increase in G, the xed costs which should be incurred to operate a foreign subsidiary in a country where a rm had not been previously established. While the result of such a n increase is obvious and expected (exports are more likely), we report this diagram especially as an example of what happens when inequality A1' is not satis ed. Indeed, under the parameters' con gurations chosen we h a ve that the MNE chooses to export in both periods.
The analysis of this simple parametric model con rms the main intuitions obtained from the more general models studied in section 2 and 3. It also allows us to gain some insights on how speci c variables a ect the possibility to observe spillovers through workers' mobility. In particular, spillovers are more likely to occur the more similar the technological capabilities of the MNE and the local rm (a is close to 1) the higher transport costs and tari s the higher the educational level of the local workforce, which implies lower training costs the lower the degree of substitutability g between the goods produced by the MNE and the local rm (this makes it more likely for the 'e ciency' or 'joint-pro t' e ect underlined in section 2 to hold).
The last point deserves further comments. The fact that the informed manager is hired by a local rm which is not a close competitor of the MNE implicitly requires that the knowledge acquired by the manager is broad enough. Therefore, the result that spillovers occur more frequently when the degree of substitution between goods is low can be reinterpreted as saying that spillovers are more frequent when the MNE gives its manager a broader know-how. In other terms, one should expect workers having general skills to be more easily involved in moving from MNE to local rms.
Welfare
In our model the di erent equilibrium con gurations can be easily ranked in terms of welfare of the host country. FDI is preferred to exports, since it saves transport costs (which bene ts consumers), it raises government revenues if the a liate's pro t is taxed, and it gives informational rents to the local manager. In turn, FDI with spillovers is preferred to a situation where after FDI the a liate keeps the manager, since by hiring her the local rm would make pro t that it could not earn otherwise.
The fact that FDI is always better than export is obviously the result of the simple structure of our model. It is well known that there exist circumstances where FDI is detrimental to the host country. F or instance, the establishment of a foreign a liate might pre-empt the entry of a local rm (see Motta, 1992) , or foreign a liates might rely on imports from the home country, t h us displacing host production (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). The model is therefore not adequate to evaluate whether FDI is welfare improving or not with respect to exports.
This quali cation made, one can wonder whether -within the framework developed here -there exists any policy instrument which a host country might use to improve i t s w elfare. The comparative statics exercise carried out in this section would seem to suggest such a conclusion. In certain regions of parameter values, by giving a subsidy to nance (part of) the xed costs of the MNE, by contributing to the expenses incurred to train local workers, or by raising a tari , the local government can attract FDIs and facilitate the creation of spillovers. Speci cally, this improvement occurs when these interventions would change the equilibrium outcome in a given region of the parameter space. For instance, Figure 3 (ii) shows that there exists a region where a decrease in training costs might result in an equilib-rium with spillovers, whereas no spillovers would have arisen in the absence of government i n tervention.
Nevertheless, the welfare improvement is conditional on the change in the equilibrium outcome, and entails an important discontinuity. 25 If the government is not able to predict the outcome of the game with su cient precision, it might g i v e a subsidy to the MNE when spillovers would take place anyhow or it might g i v e a subsidy which is insu cient t o m o ve the equilibrium outcome to a region with spillovers. The subsidy might therefore result in a welfare loss for the host country, or might not improve it. This implies that strong informational requirements are needed to ensure that a government can intervene to improve w elfare. Extreme caution must therefore be taken before arriving at any strong policy conclusion.
Summary and conclusions
Spillovers have often been treated as a 'black b o x' mechanism, where their nature is left unspeci ed. In this paper we p r o vided a speci c mechanism through which t e c hnology and knowledge might u n voluntarily move f r o m a rm towards others located in the same country. Therefore, this paper o ers a rationale to the empirical literature which has uncovered the importance of localized spillovers (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 1996) .
We h a ve presented a model where technological spillovers from FDIs might occur due to workers' mobility. A MNE can transfer a superior technology to its foreign a liate only after having trained local managers. Once informed, these managers can later be hired by a local rm and technological spillovers might occur. Even when such spillovers do not take place, the host country welfare might i m p r o ve because of the informational rent that trained managers receive b y the MNE to prevent them from moving to a local rm.
We h a ve a l s o s h o wed that in some circumstances a MNE might prefer to resort to exports rather than FDIs, precisely to avoid dissipation of superior technology to local rivals and/or the payment of informational rents to local workers.
Our model helps identify the conditions under which a M N E k eeps the informed workers, and those under which t h e y l e a ve to a local rm. The results are consistent with the industrial organization literature on persis-25 See Horstmann and Markusen (1992) for similar discontinuities in equilibria in a model of choice between FDI and exports. tence of monopolies. Spillovers arise (the monopoly ceases to exist) when the 'joint-pro t' (or 'e ciency') e ect holds, that is, when industry pro ts are higher if both rms can use the technology. This is more likely to happen when the local and the MNE are not close competitors, and when the knowledge acquired by the workers is broad rather than speci c.
We h a ve also analyzed how other variables would a ect the existence of such spillovers induced by w orkers' mobility. In particular, we h a ve found that spillovers are the more likely to arise the more similar the technological levels of local rms and MNEs, and the lower the costs of training the local workforce. The MNE plays according to di erent strategies depending on the manager's type. The local rm, on the other hand, cannot observe the manager's type, and it plays according to the same strategy. We use the following notation: x is the MNE's o er to the manager when she is of high type, q is its o er when she is of low t ype, y is the local rm's o er. Z( ) i s the cumulative distribution function used by the local rm to randomize its o ers. The MNE randomizes according to H( ) when the manager is of high type. The corresponding density functions are h( ) a n d z( ). H(y x) is H( ) as a function of x evaluated at y, and Z(x y) i s Z( ) as a function y evaluated at x. E( 2 i ) is the expected second period equilibrium pro t of rm i.
First, we derive the local rm's equilibrium strategy, and the MNE's equilibrium strategy when the manager is of high type. To nd these strategies we assume that the MNE's equilibrium strategy is q = 0 when the manager is of low t ype. Then, we v erify that q = 0 is indeed an equilibrium.
Consider the problem of the local rm. No matter the belief it holds, it will never o er more than 2 D f . In equilibrium the local rm randomizes according to the density function that maximizes its expected pro ts given 
Finally, inserting (16) respectively in (15) and (12) one obtains the distribution functions given in Lemma 1.
In deriving H( ) a n d Z( ) w e h a ve been assuming that q = 0. The only thing left to show is therefore that q = 0 is a best response to Z( ). If the MNE loses the manager, its second period pro t is 
By inserting (15) in (17) and maximizing with respect to q, i t i s e a s y t o show that q = 0 is the best response to the strategy of the local rm. QED 
Proof of Lemma 2
We h a ve t wo candidate separating equilibria: 1) the MNE exports when the manager is of high type, and does FDI when the manager is of low t ype 2) the MNE chooses FDI when the manager is of high type, and exports when the manager is of low t ype.
In the rst candidate equilibrium the MNE's pro t is given by
Semi-Separating equilibria
For each manager's type the MNE can choose FDI, or exports, or to randomize between the two. There are therefore nine candidate equilibria to consider. Four of the candidate equilibria have already been analyzed as they are separating or pooling. Here we study the remaining ve semiseparating equilibria.
By substituting for the value of ( ) one obtains:
There are two candidate equilibria left out: 4) The MNE chooses exports when the manager if of low t ype, and randomizes between FDI and exports when the manager is of high type, and 5) The MNE chooses exports when the manager is of high type and randomizes between FDI and exports when the manager is of low t ype. It can be shown, along the same lines as in the previous proofs, that these equilibria do not exist generically. T o s a ve space, proofs are omitted. QED
